Migration in 21st-Century Iberia: The Politics and Patterns of Anti-Immigrantism and Emigration

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Despite migration being a social phenomenon as old as humanity itself and, in modern times, international migration is by definition a political act, political science was arguably the last of the social sciences to study it. With few exceptions, were we to consider only the field of political science, the crossing of political boundaries mattered little until after World War II, as politicians and policy-makers began to treat borders as a security concern and, perhaps more importantly, as migration itself became a hot-button issue throughout the developed world. Yet according to one of the first political scientists to seriously study international migration, Gary Freeman, in his 1995 article “Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States,” not all developed, migrant-receiving countries are exactly alike: there are traditional settler societies (U.S., Canada, Australia), post-colonial and guestworker societies (UK, France, Germany), and new countries of migration (Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece). It goes without saying that political scientists like typologies, and this one in particular has proven its utility over time (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004, Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014). However, the challenges faced (or merely perceived) by any receiving country are essentially the same: border security, unemployment, drains on the welfare state, dilution of national culture, etc. Addressing these issues brings us to Freeman’s, and thus political science’s, other major contribution to the field of migration studies: the study of reactionary, right-wing backlashes against immigrants and immigration. However, according to Freeman himself, this is paradoxically a detriment to the field’s potential as such a focus leads to ad hoc studies that are simultaneously overly normative and descriptive as well as theoretically weak (2005: 111, 117).

Other avenues of political science research include systematic studies of a given polity’s sentiment toward immigrants, in the form of public opinion. But again we run into problems, this time regarding the availability of reliable and comparable statistics (ibid.: 115). Despite myriad surveys and polls covering autochthonous public opinion, integration policy success and failure, or the opinions of migrants, be they from the Migration Integration Policy Index, the Eurobarometer, the United Nations Development Programme, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, or the German Marshall Fund, to name a few, there is a dearth of
statistically comparable data, even in 2014. From there, regarding the study of public opinion
and how it translates into policy, there is debate over whether or not opinion even matters,
especially in Europe (Lahav 2004). Is this a problem? Maybe, but this depends on one’s
approach. Owning to the fact that diverse sources of the public’s positions on immigration differ
greatly from country to country, and to the different treatment public opinion receives across the
social sciences methodologically, according to the OECD’s Continuous Reporting System on
Migration (known by its French acronym SOPEMI), “there is no single definition of public
opinion as a concept” (SOPEMI 2010: 117-118). So should political scientists go back to
ignoring the study of the politics of migration all together? Not so soon; what is sustained herein
is that what we must do is first recognize what our field has to offer and then where it can
contribute to migration studies.

The task at hand then is to reconceptualize the theory and typology of receiving states,
while at the same time staying true to political science, in the study of the politics of
contemporary migration to Spain and Portugal. Our proposal is that, given their relatively low-
levels of anti-immigrantism, their recent experiences under authoritarian regimes and as
countries of emigration, and intensifying patterns of substitution migration at present, we
consider how the Iberian countries may serve as models of migration transition for future host
countries. In order to attain this goal, we turn to the work of another political scientist, Roxanne
Lynn Doty. In her 2003 book Anti-Immigrantism in Western Democracies, she puts forth the
broad notion of “anti-immigrantism” as a bifurcated response to the perceived threats posed by
contemporary immigration (2003: 14-15): the state reacts with increasingly restrictive policy
measures, practices and laws (27-31) while within a given host society, she identifies a neo-
racism based not as much on the racial differences of the past, but rather contextually specific
cultural differences (18-27). The utility of such an approach, however methodologically and
conceptually nebulous, is that it allows us to consider place-specific, ad hoc survey data as well
as policies, political parties, and one-off events, such as anti-immigrant laws and customs,
populist organizations, and xenophobic attacks on migrants throughout western host societies to
gain a better, albeit broad, understanding of how and why a given country reacts to immigration
as it does.

Ultimately, at its broadest, a given society’s or state’s response to migrants and
immigration may be generally positive, neutral, or negative. For example, a state with
increasingly restrictive and discriminatory policies, in which right-wing parties fueled by populist nativism gain traction, and whose people violently assault immigrants, would be considered anti-immigrant. This is not the exclusive pattern of the “traditional settler societies” or the “post-colonial and guestworker societies” described above, but such realities in many of the countries across the typology are hard to ignore. Conversely, on the whole, Spain and Portugal do not follow this model of anti-immigrantism. According to the aforementioned UNDP, Portuguese policies regarding migrants’ access to social services are the most open in Europe (United Nations Development Programme 2009: 37-38). Regarding the maintenance of cooperative agreements between the state and religious groups of any faith, which in theory serve to both protect minority rights and ensure religious freedom (as the migration of Muslims to the Peninsula has been on the rise for decades), Spain is seen as a world leader (de la Hera 2007; Zapata-Barrero 2006: 149-150). Quantitatively, turning to public opinion, according to International Social Survey Programme data from 1995 and 2005, comparing both countries to several other English-Speaking settler societies and traditional European lands of migration, Spain and Portugal demonstrated the lowest scores in response to statements such as “immigration levels should be reduced,” “immigrants should not have some rights,” and “government spending on immigrants should be decreased” (Wright 2011: 846). On MIPEX indices, both countries consistently rank on the positive side of EU averages (see Figure 1). Additionally, there is no Front National, Liga Nord, or Golden Dawn in either Spain or Portugal. Considering anti-immigrantism in this way allows us to see that the respective Iberian states and societies exhibit an openness that does not follow the European norm.

This paper makes two fundamental assumptions as points of departure: 1) following the above, that Spain and Portugal evidence lower levels of anti-immigrantism than most other European receiving countries; and 2) the experience of future host societies will follow most closely that of the Iberian countries, undergoing democratic and migration transitions at about the same time and thus being obliged to address the consequences of both concurrently. From there, for the purposes of entertaining the mere possibility of mid-range theory building, we will speculate as to whether or not the post-authoritarian and post-migration transition experiences and outcomes of Spain and Portugal may serve as models for future countries of immigration. Is this even possible? Perhaps. Or might it be that the Iberian experience(s) as host countries, and
the histories that shaped them, are too unique and thus provide barren ground for theorizing and theory building.

![Figure 1 - Europe, Spain, and Portugal MIPEX Rankings on Seven Policy Indicators](image)

Source: Migrant Integration Policy Index (www.mipex.eu)

Note:

*Europe*: EU-27 Members plus Norway and Switzerland

*Labor Market Mobility*: Do legal third-country nationals have comparable workers' rights and opportunities like EU nationals/nationals to access jobs and improve their skills?

*Family Reunification*: Do legal third-country nationals have a comparable right to reunite in their families like EU nationals who move from Member State to another?

*Education*: Are all the children of immigrants encouraged to achieve and develop in school like the children of nationals?

*Political Participation*: Do legal third-country nationals have comparable opportunities as nationals to participate in political life?

*Long Term Residence*: Do legal third-country nationals have comparable access to a long-term residence permit like EU nationals who move from another Member State?

*Access to Nationality*: Are legal immigrants encouraged to naturalise and are their children born in the country entitled to become full citizens?

*Anti-Discrimination*: Do all residents have effective legal protection from racial, ethnic, religious, and nationality discrimination in all areas of life?

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*The Comparative Politics of Autochthonous Anti-Immigrantism*

Across the social sciences, concerning the study of immigration, we find a consensus of opinion in need of comparative work that is sensitive to contexts and historical backgrounds (Massey et al. 1993: 456-7). Indeed, historian Diner tells us that a singular focus on one country or group, while descriptively informative, is done at the expense of comparative work “which would seem to be fundamental to a scholarly format for both the incorporation of existing theories and the creation of new ones” (2008: 43). Sociologist Reitz affirms that “[d]eveloping a
theory of immigrant reception taking account of the impact of host societies is greatly aided by comparative perspectives” (2002: 1007). Within the field of political science more concretely, regarding migration studies, there is no doubt that comparative work is valued (Freeman 2005; Hollifield 2008: 197). In fact, specifically to questions of politics within host countries,

“[t]o understand the politics of international migration, we must compare immigration politics and policy outcomes among the liberal democracies. We must examine the way in which states have attempted to use foreign workers to regulate national labor markets, and look at the liberal reaction against statist/realist policies. Finally, we must study the issue of citizenship, to understand how foreign workers have been transformed in each country from expendable commodities (guestworkers) into objects of political conflict” (Hollifield 1992: 590-591).

Not only is there a general, pluridisciplinary opinion in favor of comparative work, such an approach also facilitates a means to consider politics and policies of the host countries, including a consideration of the radical right (which is important) yet without obsessing over it:

“Getting to the roots of anti-immigrant sentiments and their connection to the way nationals of the receiving construct their own identities in relation to immigrants should be a prime research agenda for scholars of international migration... Again it is a question that would be better served by cross-national and comparative research on the question of reception” (Brettell and Hollifield 2008: 21).

Synthesizing the above and placing it into the context and framework of this paper, the present work is inherently comparative. The starting point is anti-immigrantism in Spain and Portugal with the end goal being the evaluation of the Iberian countries as models to better understand future countries of migration. In addition to giving proper consideration to historical context and analysis, comparative study also facilitates our moving beyond the state and the radical right, in light of the aforementioned concerns of Lucassen (2005) and Favell (2008), who lament the obsession with present day immigration. Furthermore, Rietz informs us that “[c]ross-national differences often raise significant issues not identified as prominent in debate within any given country” (2002: 1007). Finally, Brettell and Hollifield tell us that cross-national comparisons allow us to better assess “cultural baggage” and socio-economic factors present in the discussion of contemporary immigration, facilitating our understanding of what is specific and what is general with the given cases studied (2008: 15). That is exactly what is done herein.

The Politics of Immigration in Iberia
The motives for comparatively studying the respective levels of anti-immigrantism in the Iberian countries are plentiful. The histories of Spain and Portugal are long, rich, and suitable for comparative examination across the intellectual spectrum. Yet, as historian Townson notes in his work on the later years of the Franco dictatorship, despite years of massive social and political change, twentieth-century Spain has rarely been considered following an interdisciplinary framework (2010: 2). Understanding the socio-political changes that have occurred since migration transition, from a multidisciplinary and comparative perspective, will be the key to determining whether or not the Iberian experience provides migration studies any means to mid-range theory-building regarding the rise of anti-immigrantism (or not) in future host countries.

Geographer Russell King and his collaborators presented some of the first descriptive studies of immigration to Southern Europe (King and Rybaczuk 1993). Corkill, an economic historian and expert on Iberia, offers a thorough, comparative analysis of the labor market need for immigration in Spain and Portugal (2001). Geddes gives an excellent chapter on the politics and policies of the Southern European countries within the broader context of the European Union (2003: 149-172). Messina, in a study of the politics of immigration in Post-World War II, only superficially addresses Spain and Portugal, almost always pairing the two together throughout (2007). That being said, both Geddes and Messina rightly show that the Iberian countries face similar policy pressures from the EU and thus that their immigration policies are in many ways indicative of that. But what the authors do not address or explain is how and why the internal politics of both are unique within Europe or how they are different from each other. Neither demonstrates knowledge of the long swath of Iberia’s fragmented history and how it is influential in today’s politics pertaining to immigration.

The claim has been made, for example, that given the richness of her political history and experience, in no other Western European country has there been “such passionate introspection” as in Spain (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 1). Kamen observes a deep ideological antagonism within Spain, rooted in that very past, that “in reality is an enormous chasm that can bar the way to any tranquil discourse” (2008: xii). This introspection is increasingly evident when immigration is at the center of debate. Some see the Iberian medieval experience as a facilitator of the integration of migrants, particularly those of the Muslim faith (Jahanbegloo 2007). However, Encarnación claims that suspicion of and animosity toward Muslim immigrants run deeper in Spain than in other European countries due to “a long and complicated history with the
Muslim world in which Spain has been both the conquered victim as well as the triumphant conqueror” (2004: 171; see also Zapata-Barrero 2003, 2009 and Aramburu 2004).

Portugal, on the other hand, has for centuries been a country that looks outward, foregoing the constant and often politically motivated introspection that is unavoidable in her Iberian neighbor (Magalhães 2009). Monteiro and Costa Pinto observe that, for the most part since the thirteenth century, debate over Portuguese national identity has been absent, owing socially to its ethnic, cultural and linguistic unity and geographically to the territorial integrity of the country (2011). Unlike in Spain, while the Reconquest of the country from Moorish rule and the subsequent imperial discoveries have at times fueled nationalism in Portugal, throughout the 19th and 20th Centuries the threats perceived by Portuguese society and government have been other states, such as France, England, and Spain, which has been the modern driver of nationalism in Portugal (ibid.: 56-61). In the latter part of the twentieth century, it was the dictatorship’s desire to hang on to Portugal’s African colonies that fueled nationalism (Alexandre 2011: 86-94). In other words, due to her uniquely long reign as an imperial power from the 1400s to 1974, Portugal evidences a different arena for political debate on issues of immigration from Spain, despite the Castilian crown also being a former colonial power.

Nonetheless, the reality on the ground in both countries is not as black and white as is implied throughout the comparative work on the topic of immigration to the Iberian Peninsula in most of the literature published to now. Wiarda reminds us that “[t]he weight of tradition, of history, and of the past has long hung heavily over Iberia” (1993: 241). Therefore, due to myriad historical reasons, some nuanced and others rather obvious, a comparative study of contemporary immigration to Spain and Portugal must be long in historical scope and attentive to how seemingly similar contexts are not always as they appear. To ignore history in any study of contemporary Iberia will inevitably lead any researcher to conclusions that are incomplete at best or incorrect at worst, which will in turn ruin any attempt at theory-building or the creation of an Iberian model of migration transition from the outset.

Lastly, to the point of the present paper, for various historical, political, and economic reasons, Spain and Portugal provide the best case studies for the broad applicability of hypothesis testing and theory building to better understand and predict how both recent democratic and migration transitions might affect future receiving countries, as the number of host countries will assuredly continue to grow in other parts of the world as democracy
consolidates: in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and perhaps even in North Africa and Southwest Asia. This follows another of Hollifield’s observations that immigration is a problem for many in Switzerland, but for no one in North Korea; “[a]lmost by definition, the more liberal and democratic a society is, the greater the likelihood that migration control will be an issue” (2008: 190). However, the fact of the matter is that while the contexts of democratic and migration transition will differ from state to state, all will almost inevitably be new-democracies, having been non-democratic, and transit or substitution migration countries at best, nearly up to the moment of migration transition and the permanent settlement of immigrants. But it is through understanding history that we might better grasp how liberal and institutional pressures come to bear on any newly-formed democratic polity, as was the case in Spain and Portugal.

Patterns are useful and comparative study facilitates both our ability to understand and even predict outcomes in future cases. For example, despite the novelty of contemporary immigration, or perhaps because of it, in addition to policies being praised and there being no anti-immigrant parties at the national level, survey data from the Iberian countries indicate an openness to migration not seen in other parts of Europe, both in states with a history of colonial and guestworker emigration as well as the new(er) countries of migration. This is why I have chosen to focus on a lack of anti-immigrantism specifically in Spain and Portugal, foregoing the cases of the other recent European countries having undergone migration transition: Greece, Ireland, and Italy. While the latter three all underwent migration transition at about the same time as the Iberian countries, the former two are arguably the “most” post-democratic and least anti-immigrant, and although similar to each other, as addressed above, they provide enough differences to provide the raw materials for a productive comparative case study, which as of today has yet been done.

If we are able to both appreciate and understand the unique historical precedents that have led up to migration transition in the Iberian countries, at the very least future researchers will learn to not fall into the common trap of jumping to conclusions regarding history and its consequences on contemporary politics, especially in “similar” countries, or that all new countries of migration will inherently mirror the experiences of the traditional Anglophone settler-societies or, more likely, those of the Western European receiving countries. For we must remind ourselves that in the near-term future, most host societies will be neither Anglophone (with the nuanced exception of South Africa) nor Western European (as all of them already are).
In numerous ways the Iberian political experience with democratic and migration transition will be most similar to that of future countries of migration. Spain and Portugal, once hardly considered fully European or members of the “first world” (López-Baralt 1992: 1-44), are now treated models of both democratic transition (Wiarda 1993, 1996; Gillespie 1993; Linz, Stepan, and Gunther 1995) and of European integration (Schmitter 2003). As the global community of democracies expands, could a better understanding of the politics of immigration in Iberia be insightful for other countries that will inevitably experience migration transition?

*Iberian Migration in the 21st Century: Transitioning Again?*

Emigration came to an abrupt halt, particularly in Spain, by the early-to-mid-1970s, thanks to the global oil crisis and because of sustained economic and political development and modernization at home. Shortly thereafter immigration became the norm as both countries became members of the European Union in 1986 and experienced nearly three decades of growth throughout the 80s, 90s, and until the downturn beginning in 2008. Although the transition from agrarian-based to service-centered economies, without large-scale, geographically dispersed industrialization, has produced positive results regarding the influx of immigrants in that little competition between native and migrant labor ever developed, the current crisis sheds light on the pitfalls of a dependence on the tertiary sector and the threat of population loss. In this section, we will briefly explore how the economic crisis has slowed immigration flows to, while reigniting emigration from, both Spain and Portugal. Despite facing undoubtedly crippling economic realities which have stoked anti-immigrant fervor elsewhere in Europe, there still remains little evidence of a backlash against newcomers to either of the Iberian countries at present. The issue of immigration has remained largely un-politicized, policy makers now fret over shrinking populations, and everyone within both polities, regardless of national origin, faces the same concerns of cuts to social welfare and ever-tightening access to credit. Emigration has again become an equal opportunity remedy for all.

As has been well-documented in the press and in interviews with the author, at present, emigration from Spain and Portugal is an undeniable reality for many, but as far as autochthonous workers are concerned, it is predominantly younger, highly educated professionals who, seeing little opportunity for themselves at home, have taken to leaving their respective countries en masse (Rabiais 2012; Playà Maset 2012a, 2012b). An over-dependence on the service sector jobs
of all kinds combined with ever-increasing education levels in both countries has meant that many young people today have university degrees - too many for the economy to handle (Huete Machado 2011; Playà Maset 2012b; 2012c). The press documents almost daily the effects and repercussions of this social change that seemingly happened from one day to the next.

According to data from Spain’s **Instituto Nacional de Estadística**, between 1 January of 2013 and 2014, the number of Spanish citizens living abroad increased by over six-and-half percent, topping the two million mark, up from 1.2 million in 2008 when the economic crisis began (González Ferrer 2013). The Portuguese government reported that between January and September of 2011 the number of unemployed emigrants increased just over forty-five percent as compared to the same period of time the year prior (“Número de desempregados…” 2012). Those who teach German in Spain are not in need of work but rather more hours in the day as there has been a spike in enrollment as young Spaniards have turned back to Germany for employment opportunities, as their grandparents did in the mid-twentieth century (Álvarez 2012). As citizens of the European Union, moving to another EU member state to look for work has become a normal thing to do after graduation, even in the Nordic countries, Holland, and the UK, which have not been traditional destinations for the Spanish emigrants of the past (Navarro 2012).

Zooming out geographically, we can even see patterns of what might be called “reverse colonial migration” as the new class of Spanish expatriates heads to Latin America for more opportunities and even better salaries (Sabatés 2012). The government of Quebec has actively recruited young, inexperienced yet skilled workers from Catalonia (Playà Maset 2012c). Several Asian airlines have proven to be welcoming of Spanish commercial pilots as the number of flights between Latin America and Spain has been drastically reduced because of the crisis, including the folding of two low-cost Spanish-based airlines which catered to Latin American immigrants living in Spain (Aldama 2011). However, in the face of a tide of Spaniards overstaying their time as tourists, visa restrictions have become a reality for holders of Spanish passports in places like Brazil (Playà Maset 2012b), a country which itself has recently undergone migration transition (Keating 2012b). Perhaps not surprisingly, as the number of emigrants has increased so drastically, so has the number of Spaniards who find themselves in prison overseas. Having increased by thirty-three percent from 2008 to 2012, some 2,500
Spanish citizens are imprisoned throughout the Americas and Europe, with over eighty percent having been convicted of drug-related crimes (Alonso Matías 2012).¹

While it is easy to identify and define the “typical” native-born Iberian emigrant at present, all types of former immigrants to the Peninsula have chosen to return home or to re-emigrate to a third country, young and old, both skilled and unskilled (Pérez de Pablos 2011). As skilled workers lose work, unskilled laborers also lose work. In Spain, we have seen three “bubbles” burst in succession: the credit bubble, the housing bubble, and now, as a consequence of the first two provoking massive unemployment, the labor bubble; what this has meant for low-skilled immigrant labor is that as the economy has contracted, construction work has slumped to a recent low, domestic work is increasingly scarce, and one-way tickets to Latin America have been purchased (Díaz-Varela 2011).² Regarding Portugal, Alberto Matos of the Bloco de Esquerda wittily declared to the author that immigrants have so integrated themselves into the local culture that in the face of economic crisis and unemployment, just like the Portuguese, they themselves emigrate (2012). This of course does not mean that immigration to the Iberian countries has stopped entirely. Asylum seekers and laborers still risk life and limb to cross the Straits of Gibraltar, to sail to the Canary Islands, or to climb militarized fences to gain entry into the autonomous city of Melilla, one of two Spanish enclaves on the Moroccan coast (Minder and Yardley 2013; “Un centenar de inmigrantes…” 2014).

In spite of the triple bubble burst, anti-immigrant rhetoric was hardly present in the any of the electoral campaigns run after the crisis began. Evidence to the contrary is present but sparing. Catalonia has proven to be the one exception during the local/municipal elections of May of 2011 in which the Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC), an anti-immigrant and blatantly xenophobic party founded in the early years of the previous decade, had its strongest showing yet. Running on an anti-immigrant platform, the PxC increased the number of members holding seats on city and town councils from 15 to 77, with a presence now in 40 municipalities, inspiring its founder and now defenestrated leader, Josep Anglada, to aim for a greater presence at the regional level.
and throughout the rest of Spain (Anglada 2012). Perhaps borrowing the rhetoric of Anglada and his PxC, in these same local elections the conservative Popular Party in the Barcelona suburb of Badalona employed an overtly anti-immigrant discourse, which was credited by many for its victory in a traditional Socialist Party stronghold (Bosh i Garcia 2012; Caubet Busquet 2012).³ The thinking on the part of some who work with and in immigrant communities in Catalonia was that the success of the experiment in Badalona would translate into the PP’s strategy for the national elections the following year (Sanahuja Vélez 2012; Cuevas Barba 2012). When all of the comparative signs from most other Western European polities would have indicated that that would have been the way to go for the major conservative party in the country (Keating 2012a: 25; Freeman 1997), it proved not to be the case in Spain. In fact, in the national parliamentary elections held in both Spain and Portugal, respectively, in 2011, and there was little-to-no mention of immigration; despite the crisis, the issue remained all but un-politicized and the PxC has all but disappeared.

Although in the abstract immigration has not been politicized in electoral campaigns in either of the Iberian countries, it is inevitably a concern for those who win elections the second they cease to be candidates and become policy makers. Since migration transition, the policy-making process has been sporadic and reactive: at first, legislatures, executives, and bureaucrats had little notion of the arrival of migrants (Corkill 2001: 830). Into the 80s and 90s, the EU mandated rules from Brussels, particularly regarding border control (Boswell and Geddes 2011). By the mid-1990s and well into the following decade, contrary to the wishes of Brussels, regularizations became the norm in Lisbon and Madrid (Arango and Finotelli 2009: 31). Integration programs have been helpful, both in ways that they were planned to be, as well as with unexpected yet productive outcomes. Portugal falls in the “planned” category (United Nations Development Programme 2009) while Spain’s religious freedom laws may be classified as positive, for example, having been formulated before migration, they were clearly not made with integration in mind as the principal policy outcome (Larson 2010: 22-23). By the current

³ Coincidently, Badalona was also a center of nineteenth-century industrialization in Catalonia and thus home to generations of internal migrants and their families from poorer parts of Spain throughout the twentieth century. In a personal interview, Imma Boj, Director of the Catalan Museum of the History of Immigration, assured the author that the previous experience with the arrival of workers from other parts of Spain, which is to say, non-Catalans, aides the understanding and acceptance of culturally and linguistically diverse immigrants from other countries at present, especially in places like Badalona (2012). For sake of balance, Josep Anglada, also in an interview with the author, vehemently denies a connection between the two as those who came to Catalonia in the twentieth century from other parts Spain were Spanish (as are the Catalans, presumably).
decade, in this era of post-economic crisis, one of the major policy concerns pertaining to migration is population loss.

Almost always ahead of the rest of the peninsula, economically speaking, the leaders of the Generalitat (the regional parliament) had long ago approvingly made the connections among economic development and population decline, and immigration and population growth, celebrating when the Autonomous Community would hit the next million mark (Bosch i Garica 2012). However, for the first time since the end of the Spanish Civil War (in 1939) Catalonia, a traditional engine of the Spanish economy and long a home to both internal and international immigration, actually lost population in 2011, both due to the effective cessation of immigration and growing emigration of both autochthonous and migrant workers (Playà Maset 2012a; Playà Maset and Sen 2012); the number of foreigners in Barcelona began to fall in 2010, which some have called a “paradigm shift” (Aroca 2011: 2). By about this time, there was also concern at the national level, as in-bound migration tapered off and emigration of younger, educated workers was clearly evident, the central government of Spain realized that population growth would soon be stagnant (Yerga Cobos 2012). Population decline can be a good thing in the time of economic recession as it can help to alleviate unemployment figures (“Final Call” 2014), which was the case in both Spain and Portugal during the middle decades of last century. However, in today’s context, the circumstances are drastically different. Unlike the postwar years, emigration at present is marked by highly-educated people who, while not necessarily wealthy, are certainly not poor and do have earning potential. This is not the recipe for economic recovery as such emigration also means empty and unsold homes flooding the real estate market, reduced consumer spending, increasing the per capita debt burden, and the flight of both brains and capital (Buck 2014; Thomas 2012). The concern now is how to keep just about anyone with money to spend (or the potential to earn in) from leaving the country.

We may also find historical parallels, albeit in the reverse, as indicators of other migration-related policy measures at present. In terms of the migration of capital, in the face of the economic woes mentioned above, policy makers in both of the Iberian countries have increasingly sought to attract investment from former colonies (Minder 2012a; Mark 2011). In recent years, descendants of Portuguese colonial citizens in the Indian city of Goa are renouncing

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4 It should also come as no surprise that investment from China has also been sought (Magalhães 2012: 22).
Indian citizenship in droves for a Portuguese (which is to say European) passport; Lisbon does not seem to mind, although the legal ramifications of doing so are as of yet clear under Indian law (Johari 2014; Moniz Barbosa 2014). The Spanish parliament, with the support of the House of Borbón, has acted to allow the return of descendants of Sephardic Jews who were expelled during the Inquisition; the idea is that Spain can “right the historic error” of the expulsion of its Jewish community centuries ago by facilitating a fast-track naturalization process for those who are now citizens of an array of countries, such Turkey, Venezuela, and Brazil (Martín 2014). A tongue-in-cheek test of cultural anti-immigrantism would lead one to ask if the descendants of the Caliphate of Granada will be offered a fast-track to Spanish citizenship anytime soon (Kassam 2014). Regardless of religion, ethnicity, or origin, what is clear is that both attracting investment and averting population decline are policy concerns in the Iberian capitals and fostering immigration and stemming emigration are now priorities throughout the Peninsula.

While immigration has remained out of bounds as a political issue and the urgent need to facilitate it has become a policy goal in both Spain and Portugal, in the former, health care costs in the age of austerity have indeed become a political hot-button for both immigrants and young emigrants alike. Debate over the access to health care by undocumented immigrants in Spain, especially under the current conservative government, has become more open (Sahuquillo and Benito 2012; Sahuquillo 2012; Playà Maset 2012d). Regarding young Spanish emigrants, a recent change in legislation by the PP-controlled parliament in Madrid seeks to dis-incentivize leaving the country (ostensibly to reduce the budget deficit) by booting any unemployed citizen who is outside of Spanish territory for more than 90 days of a 365-day span, or the standard length of a tourist visa, off of the social security rolls (Boletín Oficial del Estado 2013). In theory, upon returning home, anyone in this situation would have to contract a private health insurance policy to receive medical care.

Regarding the private sector of the economy, and in particular the housing bubble mentioned above, immigrants find themselves in the same boat as natives. The thesis of this section is that the factors of the economic crisis discussed herein are just as likely to cause the continued emigration of immigrants as it is that of autochthonous Iberians. And for those immigrants who have made their home in Iberia and have chosen to stay and ride out the crisis, they face the same problems as and often act in solidarity with the society writ large, particularly regarding the housing bubble in Spain with has brought with it en masse evictions as mortgages
have gone unpaid (Pérez-Lanzac 2011). Banks do not know national or ethnic origin and those who have come up short on their rent and mortgage payments face the same recourse. That is until social and political pressure by both immigrants and natives led the parliament to place a moratorium on forced evictions. Shared understanding on the part of all is evident as both the native-born and those from migrant communities face the same realities and react in similar fashion: they either fight the good fight at home or emigrate from the Peninsula.

*Toward an Iberian Model of Migration Transition (or Not?)*

If most future countries of immigration will both inevitably be new democracies and likely either former countries of emigration or continued countries of substation migration, it logically follows that in order to not only best understand how immigration will be received, but even to foster the positive atmosphere exhibited by Spain and Portugal in such countries, understanding why “European” levels of anti-immigrantism have not developed should be a priority. As more countries undergo both such transitions, the present intellectual endeavor should serve as a reasonable starting point for the development of mid-range theory building on democratization and migration transition.

Gerring emphasizes the value of case studies, stating that “sometimes in-depth knowledge of an individual example is more helpful than fleeting knowledge about a large number of examples” (2007: 1). This perspective is extremely relevant to the interdisciplinary study of the politics of contemporary migration to Iberia. As the number of countries of migration continues to grow, case study allows the researcher to delve into the historical and cultural minutia of countries going through or having experienced migration transition. Thus, despite the fact that we can accept that migration policies among the predominately Western host countries have aligned (Meyers 2004; Bertossi 2008; Hollifield, Martin, Orrenius 2014), the case study allows researchers to build on previous work, for example, pertaining to the social integration of immigrants (Lucassen 2005) in a contemporary context with applicability to future post-migration transition countries. Although migration policy prescriptions are similar throughout Europe, we know that the historical experience of the Iberian countries is different from those of the rest of the Continent (Freeman 1995; Geddes 2003). Therefore, a study such as this will be of particular utility to new democracies, especially given that democratic transition is a precursor to migration transition and should cause area researchers, and more importantly
immigration scholars, to more closely examine the role of the cultural and political histories and how they influence the perception and reception of immigration in the countries they study before conclusions are drawn.

Our qualitative, macro-unit, most-similar systems comparative case-study approach, relying on predominately qualitative data, furnishes the means for us to consider both the cultural and political histories of Spain and Portugal concerning anti-immigrantism. Such an approach is best done through the complementary theoretical rubrics of historical institutionalism and comparative politics, which allow for a good balance of theoretical and empirical work. Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA), a touchstone of historical institutionalism, provides us the means to generate and test our simple hypothesis, which is a goal of small-N comparative case study (Collier 1993), that rapid modernization and subsequent democratic and migration transitions will limit anti-immigrantism (Thelen 1999: 372). In his discussion of most-similar systems, Martz states that the goal of such an approach is “to examine the theoretical implications” of a research question and that “hard on-the-ground, empirical research becomes necessary” (1994: 253). The immediate aim of this study is to empirically explain the cases at hand and test the theory behind the hypothesis; CHA leaves the doors open to subsequently refine the theory to then apply to other countries in similar circumstances (Thelen 1999: 373). Ultimately,

“[t]here is, in other words, no dichotomy between theoretical and empirical work because good analyses have to be both. The generation of the hypotheses is not the analysis, although it is the vital starting point for engaging the empirical material. The utility of a theory, after all, cannot be assessed apart from the empirical material it is meant to explain” (ibid.: 374).

Following Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, we have isolated a specific puzzle presented by two countries which may be meaningfully compared (2003: 8-9), beginning “with empirical puzzles that emerge from observed events or comparisons” (Thelen 1999: 373), in a way that has not been done before, in any context of nearly simultaneous democratic and migration transitions, as the cases of the Iberian countries are unique in Europe. In this sense, we employ these sociopolitical changes as “scope conditions” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003: 10) within these critical cases to “illuminate important general issues” (Thelen 1999: 373) and generate mid-range applicability to other cases.
At the same time, we must be careful to not overestimate the applicability of the experience of Spain and Portugal to future countries that find themselves in similar circumstances. All research tools must be subject to critical evaluation (Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2004: 9). Just as CHA provides for future comparisons in general terms, it also allows us to understand what is specific (Brettell and Hollifield 2008: 15), and thus not applicable to other cases (or any theory building efforts). While we are able to determine causal inference through contextual and historical comparison (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003: 6 and Schmitter 2003: 315 for the former, Collier 1993: 110 for the latter), such an outcome depends on cultural knowledge (Thelen 1999: 376), or, not on “breadth of coverage but depth of insight” (Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2004: 11). I hope that the identification, comparison, and testing of these two cases will lead to the fine-tuning of the overarching hypotheses, that anti-immigrantism in Iberia is due to the factors addressed throughout this paper and that future countries of migration will be more like Spain and Portugal than the more traditional countries of migration, to then target other cases that might suggest new hypotheses and theoretical ideas, which is the goal of comparative politics (Munck 2004: 119). However, just as useful to the comparativist and the migration scholar would be the awareness that the cases of Spain and Portugal are indeed unique and not comparable to other countries in seemingly similar circumstances.

The task at present is to consider how the comparatively lower levels of anti-immigrantism evidenced in Spain and Portugal when compared to their Western European neighbors will be comparable (or not) to future host countries. Building upon the assumptions presented at the outset of this paper, the contemporary socio-political realities in the Iberian countries are due to three factors 1) late economic modernization, 2) the importance of the recent processes of democratization as an elite-driven, ideational explanation; and 3) the more recent, structural phenomenon of migration transition. We may add a fourth, that continued emigration (substitution migration) by both locals and earlier migrants fosters empathy with each other (while not competing for jobs, yet).5

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5 As discussed above, what is certain is that out-bound migration is a reality in post-economic crisis Iberia. One area ripe for further research is whether or not, as more educated people leave and those who remain compete for fewer, lower-skilled positions, we will see conflict between the native-born and the migrants who have remained.
The importance of late economic development and modernization cannot be understated. This transition was characterized by the leap from predominantly agrarian-centered economies to post-industrial markets in the span of little more than a generation at the same time that education levels rose dramatically, economic and social ties to Europe were strengthened through trade and tourism, and emigration to other European countries was at its peak. Given the absence of an entrenched blue-collar class of industrial workers, seen in other Northern European countries still today, anti-immigrantism among the lower-skilled workers and lower middle classes in either country never developed. It is within such demographic groups that we have traditionally found anti-immigrant backlashes in other countries and electoral success for right-wing, xenophobic political parties. Despite some concern over the access to and payment for social services at present, which has heightened since 2008 due to the economic crisis, there is little competition for jobs, between immigrants and these host societies.

Intrinsically related to the process of economic development is that of democratization. In the respective cases of the Iberian countries, the elite-driven processes of democratic transition and Europeanization serve as ideational explanations of why anti-immigrantism is comparatively limited by European standards. Neither the state nor the society in either Spain or Portugal was ready to receive large-scale immigration once migration transition took place, which occurred at roughly the same time as democratic transition. A perfect storm of circumstances has enabled no one entity to take complete responsibility or bare the blame for today’s realities. By the time migration was a recognized reality in the streets (which occurred later in the respective parliaments) of the Iberian capitals in the mid-1980s, as EU members, Brussels had the institutional authority to dictate migration policy in both places. At the same time, a long history of elite (and often authoritarian) management in both countries has engendered apathy and acquiescence on the part of the citizenry regarding immigration. With these sentiments came an acknowledgement of their rights and responsibilities under democratic governance, which meant that by the 1980s the respective Iberian polities knew that the democratic institutions and liberal ideals that they had embraced meant that they could not blame the immigrants themselves for appearing in their countries. However, whenever there were fears that these electorates might blame their national legislatures for failing to manage the consequences of migration transition, the legislatures could in turn blame the EU for not doing its job. Consequently not wanting to
take any blame at all, even times of acute economic crisis, immigration has hardly been politicized at all by the major parties in either country.

What has further served as an insurance policy against the rise of any right-wing party of consequence is the total rejection of the authoritarian leadership of the recent past. For example, Encarnación has claimed that high unemployment was happily accepted in exchange for political freedom in mid-1970s Spain (2004: 175). To this we may add the acceptance of the consequences of large-scale immigration. That it is an established reality in a country that continues at times to struggle with its bloody political past (Richards 2002, 2013) has helped to keep the right-wing utterly marginalized from the day-to-day political discourse, to the point of non-existence. The rejection of the authoritarianism of the past has meant a less overtly xenophobic and anti-immigrant present, as liberal values and democratic institutions are now firmly embedded in both Iberian societies and governments.

Occurring just after democratic transition, migration transition additionally provides the socio-structural context for us to consider why such (relatively) little anti-immigrant sentiment exists in Iberia. Because this shared migrant experience cuts across generations and cultures, and continues today through post-crisis emigration, it provides the context in which immigration is received at present. Today’s immigrants to Iberia do the jobs that yesterday’s emigrants did throughout Europe. Not only does the stratification of the labor market ensure that there is little competition between native and immigrant workers for an increasingly scarce number of jobs (again, a reality perhaps aided by 21st-century autochthonous emigration), but considering the empathy brought about by migration transition also serves to understand why the perception of economic threats is limited. The consideration of migration transition also reinforces that of the context shaped by democratic transition: that empathy with today’s immigrants is present within these host societies, and that there is little-to-no competition for jobs, there is little negative sentiment with the electorate upon which a xenophobic right-wing party may draw.

Now the question to ask ourselves is whether or not understanding the realities in contemporary Iberia can serve to help us to begin to understand in which direction future research on democratic and migration transition should go. The author’s intuition questions whether or not Spain and Portugal provide a clear blueprint. However, it is clear that the Iberian countries’ respective processes of democratization and “Europeanization” have been widely-studied and are considered as models of democratic transition for countries throughout the world,
from Latin America to the Middle East, and especially for EU-aspirant states in Eastern Europe. Given that migration transition will almost assuredly follow democratic transition in any country, and that the socio-economic realities and developments of the Spain and Portugal of the 1970s to the 1990s will more closely represent those of the future cadre of host societies, it is superficially evident that Iberia could possibly serve as a model of how to minimize anti-immigrantism in other countries. But all qualitative theory-building, especially concerning any aspect of migration studies, is subject to constant review and the likelihood failure.

It remains to be seen whether or not the Iberian countries will serve as models of migration transition as they have for democratization, but consideration of how both countries reconciled competing interests and pressures, both endogenous and exogenous, may provide guidance for future leaders of former lands of emigration who will inevitably find themselves juggling concurrent socio-political changes and upheavals, one of which may very well likely be unforeseen inflows of immigrants. Or it could be that the experiences of Spain and Portugal are simply too unique to serve as blueprints. Goldstone reminds researchers using comparative historical analysis that “generalization is certainly a goal,” but that “[a]ssuming that certain variables have the same effects in all countries, or that specific outcomes are always produced by the same causes, may simply be a wrong starting point” (2003: 43). Although “getting to the roots of anti-immigrant sentiments” (or, in the present cases, a moderation of them) through cross-national and comparative research has been our goal (Brettell and Hollifield 2008: 21), employing analytical eclecticism with the development of middle-range theories for future studies of dual-transition countries in mind (Martz 1994), at this point one must consider the possibility that the vertiginous development seen in Iberian from the 1960-1990s, in conjunction with their distinctive processes of democratization (which include a substantial role for the EU) and the unique circumstances of their migration transitions, upon which a model of dual-transition would depend, are unlikely to be remotely paralleled elsewhere.


Anglada Rius, Josep (2012). Founder and Former President, PxC. Interview by author. Vic (Barcelona, Catalonia), Spain, 4 April.


Boj, Imma (2012). Director, MHIC. Interview by author. Sant Adrià de Besós (Barcelona, Catalonia), Spain, 24 April.


Matos, Alberto (2012). Representative of the BE. Interview by author. Lisbon, Portugal, 7 May.


Rabiais, Rosa (2012). Representative of the Partido Comunista de Portugal. Interview by author. Lisbon, Portugal, 13 April.


Yerga Cobos, Santiago (2012). Former Director Adjunto al Gabinete de la Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración (Adjunct Director of the Office of the Secretary of State of Immigration and Emigration), PSOE. Interview by author. Madrid, Spain, 7 March.

